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Abstract 
Fiscal sustainability concerns in Africa have increased recently following 
heightened fiscal vulnerabilities attributed to external factors including 
falling commodity prices that weakened fiscal revenues and growth, 
particularly for commodity-exporting African countries. To entrench fiscal 
sustainability, countries need to strengthen domestic resource mobilization 
and improve public investment management. Consequently, measures to 
increase tax revenue collections, savings mobilization and efficiency of public 
spending are critical. The G20 should support debt reporting, data 
harmonisation, tax compliance, combating illicit financial flows and 
developing effective debt resolution frameworks. 
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Challenge2 
Implementing the sustainable development strategies requires scaling up 
financial resources. Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA) have low domestic 
saving rates and continue to face severe infrastructure backlogs. Concerted 
efforts to close the infrastructure gap, however, have contributed to the 
accumulating public debt. While fiscal policy may drive a country’s 
development, it can also lead to unsustainable debt if not well managed.  
Declines in official development assistance and weaknesses in domestic 
revenue mobilization have necessitated increased use of debt, fueling concerns 
about a new debt crisis for SSA (see Table 1). The number of African countries 
at high risk or in debt distress has more than doubled from the 8 in 2013 to 18 
in 2018. Close to 40% of SSA countries are at risk of retreating into a major debt 
crisis (World Bank, 2018).  
On average, debt levels are significantly lower than what triggered the HIPC and 
MDR initiatives. However, there is a substantial variation across countries. 
Country-specific policy responses are required to balance the growing demand 
for development financing and debt sustainability. In this regard, detailed 
breakdown of external debt by creditors will be critical for implementing the 
Argentina Communique.3 
The composition of external public debt in SSA has changed drastically over the 
past decade. The share of multilateral and concessional debt in external debt 
decreased steadily while the share of non-Paris club sovereign creditors 
doubled from 15% in 2007 to 30% in 2016, with the share of Paris club 
creditors decreasing from 25% to 7% (Mustapha and Prizzon, 2018; World 
Bank, 2018). The share of market-based debt (incl. domestic debt) also has 
grown significantly.4  
                                                      
2 The more detailed analysis of the challenge facing the African countries is available at: 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/WPS_No_227_Public_Debt_Su
stainability_in_Africa_Building_Resilience_and_Challenges_Ahead_H.pdf. 
3 Defined by sustainable financing practices for both borrowers and creditors. See Berensmann (2018) 
for some of these ideas. 
4 Eurobonds issues by SSA governments stood at about USD200 million in 2006 but rose to about USD 6.3 
billion in 2015 (Hogan Lovells, 2017 database), a more than thirtyfold increase in just a decade. Eurobond 
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Increased reliance on non-traditional creditors and commercial financing has 
increased the cost of debt. Debt servicing costs averaged 11 percent of 
government revenues in 2016, up from just 4 percent in 2013 (IMF, 2018). 
Interest payments have rapidly risen as a share of government revenues just 
like the costs for public debt relative to private debt contracted over the same 
period (Figure 3). In addition, some SSA countries with large bond financing 
now face large bullet payments, most of which will be maturing in the next few 
years and presenting a potential refinancing risk (World Bank (2018). 
External debt and investment show a positive correlation, suggesting the 
increasing use of debt for growth-enhancing purpose (Figure 4). The quality 
and efficiency of public investments, however, are crucial for ensuring growth 
and fiscal sustainability. SSA countries compare unfavourably in terms of public 
investment efficiency relative to other regions, with an efficiency gap of up to 
54% (see Barhoumi et al., 2018).  
Despite aid and Foreign Direct Investment, Africa is a net creditor to the rest of 
the world of valuable development finance once Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs)5 
are taken into account. Between 1980 and 2009, illicit transfers increased 
within a range of US $1.22 to $1.35 trillion, amounting to 6% of Africa’s GDP.6 
IFFs end up weakening financial systems and reducing legitimacy of the state 
in the eyes of their citizens.7  
Proposal  
Policies for fiscal sustainability: what African countries and G20 should do.  
 Strengthening public investment management through key measures; 
namely fact based project selection using standardized technical and 
financial feasibility diagnostics; streamlining delivery of infrastructure by 
                                                      
issues by SSA have proved quite popular with investors, with many such issuances being oversubscribed 
(e.g., Senegal). 
5 Defined as “money that is illegally earned, transferred, or utilized, whereby somewhere at its origin, 
movement, or use, the money broke laws and hence it is considered illicit” Global Financial Integrity 
6 African Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity (2013):”Africa’s Illicit Financial Flows: What 
do They Tell us?” 
7 The relevance of countering IFFs has been recognized by the international community: with a global 
commitment through the Sustainable Development Goals and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, have 
committed to “redouble efforts to substantially reduce IFFs by 2030.” 
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improving the rigor of project designs, contractor selection and 
management; and more effective use of existing infrastructure, via effective 
project monitoring, adequate maintenance, and cost-reflective 
infrastructure tariffs. Others include strengthening multiyear budgeting 
and infrastructure governance and technical capabilities. Diagnostics, such 
as public investment management assessments and public expenditure 
reviews should be undertaken periodically to inform requisite remedial 
reform measures. G20 countries can support African countries through 
building and strengthening technical capacity for project appraisals, as well 
as strengthening public sector capacity to oversee or implement large-scale 
infrastructure projects.  
 Increasing domestic revenue mobilization, by shifting from commodity 
taxation towards more neutral, broad-based value-added or sales taxes and 
personal income tax. Simplifying the registration process for businesses, 
leveraging new technologies to modernize the tax collection system, 
deepening regional integration and tax coordination, are necessary 
elements of a broad-based strategy to broaden the tax base. G20 countries 
can support African countries to strengthen capacity for tax revenue 
mobilisation; e.g., design of new tax codes, digitisation of tax systems, 
including capacity to levy taxes on e-commerce and related transactions. 
 Increasing domestic savings by improving monetary frameworks, 
supporting the development of long-term savings instruments, aligning 
exchange rates on their long-term sustainable level, and reducing monetary 
financing to tame inflation. 
 Developing and implementing fiscal rules to reduce fiscal discretion and 
allow for more effective fiscal policy. Fiscal rules, if well designed and 
implemented, can help reduce the pro-cyclicality of government spending, 
encouraging savings accumulation during hay days. 
Policy measures for debt sustainability  
Recommendations to the G20 on fiscal and debt sustainability 
 Accelerate the projects on debt data reporting and standardization. Support 
countries to establish publicly available debt registers; set up Debt 
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Management offices, or strengthen capacity where the offices already exist; 
and ensure linkages between the debt management functions and other 
public finance management functions. Support development of medium 
term public investment programs that are linked to the raising of public 
debt.  
 Put in place a framework for an orderly debt resolution mechanism in the 
context of more diffuse creditor base and other new features of the debt. 
 Support efforts by African countries to enforce compliance with taxation in 
face of domestic revenues lost to profits shifting, and support DRM capacity 
development more broadly. This would require technical assistance in 
formulating revenue mobilization policies, attendant legislation and 
regulations. It would also require support with procurement of software for 
revenue recording and collection. 
 Step up efforts to combat illicit capital outflows from Africa, including helping 
track and repatriating illicit funds back to African countries. Support should 
be provided to assessing key risks relating to money laundering and illicit 
financial flows, and defining mitigation measures; building human and 
institutional capacity to uphold relevant laws, investigate suspicious activity 
and recover stolen assets; and providing the infrastructure necessary to 
track and report cash movements across borders. 
 Ensure that multilateral development institutions are adequately capitalized 
and can use their own resources - and the leverage their credibility affords - 
to offer countries alternative meaningful solutions to expensive or risky 
foreign-currency borrowing in international capital markets. Given their 
development mandate, political neutrality and strong technical expertise 
and due diligence capacity, multilateral financing is more likely to yield 
development benefits and have a catalytic role. 
 Support countries to improve long-term debt management capacity, 
governance, and transparency including: Reviewing debt sustainability 
assessment methodologies to capture new realities, notably security-related 
expenditures and the quality of public investment, and take into account 
unique features of African economies, institutions and operations of various 
  6 
Cooperation 
with Africa 
markets, including the financial and labour markets.  
 Develop innovative tools to finance development. Support the development 
of African domestic capital markets, potentially through the introduction of 
African-wide safe assets, with senior tranches potentially guaranteed by the 
MDBs and marketed to international investors as a mezzanine, investment-
grade exposure to frontier market debt. 
 Design standard terms and assist African countries in negotiations over 
innovative sources of funding that limit the need for foreign currency 
borrowing and exploit mutually advantageous exchanges with traditional or 
new bilateral lenders. Attention should be paid to crowding-in private capital 
through risk mitigation instruments to unlock resources that can substitute 
debt. Multilateral lenders can provide benchmarks and guidelines, as well as 
low-risk financing tranches for long-term projects.  
What African countries should do to improve debt sustainability.  
Emphasis should be placed on more effective and efficient use of debt, including 
through institutional and governance reforms to strengthen debt management 
and data transparency. The specific measures include:  
 Reducing reliance on risky and volatile debt sources. Developing innovative 
and alternative mechanisms of development financing such as Public 
Private Partnerships, securitization of infrastructure assets, privatization as 
recently demonstrated by Ethiopia. In addition, creation of an asset class for 
public projects, using the leverage afforded by safe capital from multilateral 
institutions is equally important. However, it is important to adequately 
quantify and mitigate the underlying fiscal risks from PPPs and government 
guarantees.  
 Increasing the maturity of external debt when possible at reasonable costs, 
making use of guarantees provided by multilateral institutions to tap 
liquidity at the long-end of the yield curve (20 to 30 years’ bonds), on the 
model of Kenya’s recent issue of a 30-year bond in February 2018. 
 Using more flexible, counter-cyclical and state-contingent debt instruments 
to relieve the debt burden during recessions, through commodity hedging 
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or GDP-indexed instruments. Key implementation challenges should be 
mitigated, notably the high liquidity and novelty premium charged at first 
issuance and the increased risk of moral hazard, especially when the 
borrower assumes excessive risks in the knowledge that relief will be 
provided. Fiscal rules may also be considered in the management of 
windfalls. 
 Developing domestic safe assets through enhanced credibility and 
independence of monetary and debt management authorities, with the 
support of the MDBs’ debt management initiatives and technical assistance. 
 Greater transparency in debt management, including commitment by 
governments to release in real-time all data on old and new debt from all 
sources. This will require efforts to standardize data gathering practices, 
develop data collection systems, address data gaps, notably in the 
accounting of SOE-related liabilities and contingent liabilities arising from 
sovereign guarantees to individual projects, and consolidate government 
accounts, across regional levels, agencies, ministries and institutions. 
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Appendix  
Figure 1: Primary balance deterioration occurred mostly through deteriorating 
revenues 
(a) Real GDP Growth 
 
(c) Government revenue and 
expenditure        
 
(b) Commodity prices variability 
over time   
  
 
 (d) Primary fiscal balance 
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Figure 2: Public debt accumulation in Africa   
 
  
Source: AfDB Statistics Department 
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Figure 3: Interest rates on Africa’s debt  
              
Source: AfDB research department 
Table 1: Risk of debt distress in selected low-income African countries as from 
2017 
Low risk  Moderate risk High risk In distress 
Rwanda (Jul. 2017) 
Senegal (Jan.2018) 
Tanzania (Jan. 2018) 
Uganda (Jan. 2017) 
Comoros (Jan. 2019) 
 
Kenya (Nov. 2018) 
Benin (Jan. 2019) 
Burkina Faso (Dec. 2018) 
Congo, DR (Oct. 2018) 
Congo, Rep (Sept. 2018) 
Côte d'Ivoire (Dec. 2018) 
Guinea (Aug. 2018) 
Guinea-Bissau (Dec. 2017) 
Lesotho (Dec. 2018) 
Liberia (Dec. 2018) 
Madagascar (Jan. 2019) 
Malawi (Jan. 2019) 
Mali (July. 2017) 
Niger (Feb. 2017) 
Nigeria (Dec. 2018) 
Sierra Leone (Jun. 2017) 
Togo (Dec. 2017) 
Burundi (Dec. 2018) 
Cameroon (Jul. 2017) 
Cabo Verde (Nov. 2017) 
Central African Rep. 
(Dec. 2017) 
Djibouti (Apr. 2017) 
Ethiopia (Jan. 2019) 
Gambia (Jul. 2017) 
Mauritania (Dec. 2017) 
 
Chad (Aug. 2017) 
Mozambique (Mar. 2018) 
South Sudan (Mar. 2017) 
Sudan (Dec. 2017) 
Zimbabwe (Jul.2017) 
Eritrea (Jan. 2019) 
Gambia (Jan. 2019) 
São Tomé and Príncipe (Dec. 
2018) 
Zambia (Oct. 2017) 
Somalia (Dec. 2017) 
 
Note: The assessment of debt risk is based on average CPIA scores over the recent years and two types 
of debt burden indicators namely, the size of debt and the debt servicing. Under each broad indicator 
a pair of sub-indicators is used – the share of exports and the share of Gross National Income (GNI). A 
set of complementary indicators is appended to each broad indicator to support the analysis (see IMF 
DSA analysis). A country is classified as at (a) Low risk, when all the debt burden indicators are well 
below the thresholds; (b) Moderate risk, when debt burden indicators are below the thresholds in the 
baseline scenario, but stress tests indicate that thresholds may be breached if there are external shocks 
or abrupt changes in macroeconomic policies; (c) High risk, when the baseline scenario and stress 
tests indicate a protracted breach of debt or debt-service thresholds, but the country does not 
currently face any repayment difficulties. 
Source: Compiled by AfDB Staff from IMF Article IV, and AfDB Statistics Department  
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Figure 4: Debt is associated with increased public investments in Africa 
Source: AfDB Research Department   𝑅2 = 0.03 
Figure 5: Number of countries with increases in government consumption, 
public investment, or both between 2013 and 2016 
 
Source: Coulibaly, Gandhi, and Senbet (2019).  
Sample excludes São Tomé and Príncipe, South Sudan, and Gambia due to data availability 
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Figure 6: Composition of public external debt 
 
Source: AfDB Statistics Department 
